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LE CHOC DE LA NOUVELLE? 
M A A S T R I C H T , D É J À V U A N D E M U R E F O R M 
Kevin Featherstone* 
This paper explores the extent to which current reforms of the Eurozonen governance re-
main encased in the constraints of the Maastricht Treaty -the narrowness of its underly-
ing paradigm; the gaps and imbalances of its design -and the implications for the future 
of the euro. With a model of "sound money, sound finances", based on the precepts of 
German ordo-liberalism, a vulnerability was exposed: it lacked the instruments, not only 
to aid, but also to police. This was exacerbated by the shallowness of public legitimation, 
ignored from the outset. The uncertainty, delays and division displayed by the Eurozone's 
response to the crisis owed much to the "lock-in" of Maastricht. The paper includes a 
critical reassessment of Dyson and Featherstone (1999). 
The governance of the Eurozone undoubtedly faces its biggest challenge in 
the context of the on-going debt crisis. At its heart is the strategic issue of 
how to manage a heterogeneous group of economies and states. This involves 
rule-setting and compliance, but it also raises a more complex agenda of 
cross-national solidarity and the ability of European Union institutions to in-
tercede domestically to steer and uphold necessary adjustments. Indeed, the 
two bailouts for Greece in 2010-2012 questioned the ability of the EU to mi-
cro-manage domestic structural reform. Much attention has been paid to the 
crisis by economists, but these are issues which are very much in the territory 
of political science. The aim of this paper is to establish how current reform 
efforts remain encased in the constraints of the Maastricht Treaty -the nar-
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rowness of its underlying paradigm and, the gaps and imbalances of its de-
sign- and the implications for the future of the euro. In essence, the questions 
come down to matters of foresight and policy learning, as well as of path de-
pendency and lock-in. 
The Maastricht constraint has reinforced the EU s tendency to economic 
orthodoxy in other cases. As Lutz and Kranke observed, in their study of 
Hungary, Latvia and Romania, "the EU s recent lending policies amount to a 
European rescue of the Washington Consensus. While the IMF has -at least in 
part- relaxed its formerly tight stance on economic conditionality attached to 
its loans, the EU has actively promoted orthodox measures in return for loans 
to those countries that are designated to join the single currency area and 
hence have to meet certain economic criteria".1 
The importance of the euro to the EU means that there are wider implica-
tions drawn from the effectiveness and nature of its policies and governance. 
The confrontation in Greece between the reforms encouraged by the "Troika" 
and the domestic resistance to the costs of austerity poses unprecedented 
questions about European integration -its norms, processes and purposes-
and its reliance on a foundation of popular legitimacy. "Europe", previously 
synonymous with modernisation, progress and economic gains, was now as-
sociated with a level of austerity not known in recent peace-time. At the same 
time, the EU was being drawn into a process of monitoring, supervision and 
conditionality -penetrating the domestic state administration via a seemingly 
permanent "Troika" office in Athens- that risked clashes of cultural frames 
and of acceptability. From a starting-point of limiting Eurozone level domes-
tic intervention in the name of governments building their own stability cul-
tures, "Europe" had been dragged into a highly fraught political contest, ques-
tioning its ability to manage the process. 
The agenda advanced by the Troika in the context of the bailouts owes 
much to previous IMF actions in states in crisis, but it also shows the extent to 
which the Eurozone remains "locked-in" to the normative underpinnings of 
the Maastricht Treaty agreed in December 1991. In order to establish this 
constraint and its current implications, this paper will: 
• Clarify the notions of path dependency and "lock-in" to be applied here; 
• Re-examine the expectations and assumptions prevalent in the Maastricht 
1. S. Lutz - M. Kranke, "The European Rescue of the Washington Consensus? EU and IMF 
Lending to Central and Eastern European Countries", LSE "Europe in Question " Discussion 
Paper Series No. 22, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2010, p. 15. 
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negotiations -with some critical self-reflection on the account given in Dyson 
and Featherstone.2 
• Consider the fragility of the Maastricht construct in the context of the 
limits of any parallel political integration. 
• Outline the failure to escape from the Maastricht principles as the euro-cri-
sis took hold in 2010-11. 
• Assess the implications for the immediate future of the Eurozone. 
1. BARGAINING, LOCK-IN AND INEFFICIENCY 
In a basic sense a treaty like that of Maastricht is intended to create enduring 
commitments, to tie the signatories in to a set of rules and mutual obliga-
tions. But the claim developed here goes further. 
Path dependency can be a glib reference and it needs careful application. In 
its strongest form, path dependence (in historical institutionalism) contradicts 
the neo-classical economic model of consistently rational behaviour leading 
to efficient and predictable outcomes. At issue, is the extent to which errors 
were made at the point of the original agreement and how far these were 
knowable and avoidable. This is what Liebowitz and Margolis, in their severe 
(rationalist) challenge to the field, refer to as "Third-degree path depend-
ence". Thus, it is not merely that the original decision appears inefficient in 
retrospect -their "Second-degree path dependence"- but that at that point 
there were alternatives and the knowledge to avoid a regrettable outcome. 
They judge the likelihood of such conditions existing to be very low.3 But, as 
Pierson points out, politics differs from economics: there is even less reason 
to assume anything like a market mechanism will be self-correcting and the 
institutional setting matters.4 
The "Third-degree path dependence" is a bold proposition: the study of 
bargaining processes, like that leading to Maastricht, can assume voluntary 
decisions by "utlity-maximisers" (the assumptions of rational choice). The 
2. K. Dyson - K. Featherstone, The Road to Maastricht: Negotiating Economic and 
Monetary Union, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1999. 
3. S.J. Liebowitz - S.E Margolis, "Path Dependence, Lock in and History", Journal of Law, 
Economics and Organization, Vol. 11, No. 1, April 1995, p. 2. 
4. P. Pierson, "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics", American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 94, No. 2, June 2000, pp. 256-257. 
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frame of historical institutionalism, however -and the interpretation of pre-
Maastricht bargaining offered in Dyson and Featherstone- emphasises the 
structuring of choices and decisions over time, with distinctive "paths" of ra-
tionality that may be sub-optimal for some negotiating parties and for the 
collective outcome.5 Learning itself is path dependent: an actor's understand-
ings are filtered by existing mental maps.6 
For some writers, path dependence is predicated on "increasing returns" or 
positive feedback processes over time, though others are not so restrictive. 
The notion refers to how the costs of switching from one alternative path to 
another will, in certain social contexts, increase markedly over time. In the 
case of EMU, a resistance to change can be readily identified over the last 
decade. This may be attributed to a set of policy beliefs being sustained over 
time that gave primacy to monetary stability, a desire to build-up the credibil-
ity of the original Treaty provisions, and recognition that a shift would im-
pose disproportionate costs on the pivotal partner, Germany. The latter was 
and is clearly crucial to the maintenance of the system and was also the pro-
genitor of the principles underpinning the original design. Even when a sys-
temic shock occurred in 2009-10, with the Greek debt crisis, the steer re-
mained tied to the original course. 
So, what exactly was being "locked-in" after Maastricht?7 The following 
sections will justify a claim of lock-in to a paradigm of "sound money, sound 
finances" and one based on an ordo-liberal belief of responsibility being held 
at the level of national governments. This same paradigm curtailed the op-
tions considered for reform of Eurozone provisions in response to the sys-
temic shock. Indeed, it served to re-define the content of "economic gover-
nance" when the notion reappeared in political debate. In sum, the prime dis-
course remained one of penalties and tightened regulation for governments 
not abiding by the rules set by Maastricht -to better overcome the "moral 
hazard" they posed to the original construct - rather than a return to the 
Keynesian-inspired ideas of the Werner Report on EMU of 1970, for example. 
5. K. Dyson - K. Featherstone, The Road to Maastricht: Negotiating Economic and 
Monetary Union, op.cit. 
6. P. Pierson, "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics", op.cit.; K. 
Thelen, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics", Annual Review of Political 
Science, Vol. 2, June 1999, pp. 369-404. 
7. W.B. Arthur, "Competing technologies, increasing returns, and lock-in by historical 
events", Economic Journal, Vol. 99, No. 116, 1989, p. 31. 
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2. THE "LOCK-IN" OF MAASTRICHT 
For Keynesians, the Werner Report of 1970 -also concerned with outlining 
the requirements of EMU- appeared intellectually superior to the provisions 
of the Maastricht Treaty.8 The latter had referred to the need for a "centre of 
decision for economic policy", with powers to coordinate fiscal policy and is-
sues of investment and consumption, infrastructure, and policy coordination 
to address the need for growth and employment. The Report foresaw a fiscal 
transfer system to provide "automatic stabilisers" and a coordinated invest-
ment programme to help states in difficulty. 
In the Inter-Governmental Conference negotiations, the Commission had 
promoted some Neo-Keynesian ideas: its own paper of May 1990 had advo-
cated that the European Council should formulate "economic policy guide-
lines" and Delors himself had shown support for a structure of "economic 
governance" at the EU level, though he avoided using the term directly. 
Delors would associate himself with the need for collective bargaining and an 
industrial policy at the EU level. His experience at the French Planning 
Commission (1962-69) had left its mark. The French Finance Minister, 
Pierre Bérégovoy, had been the first to talk of the need for a "political pole" 
to balance the "monetary pole" of EMU in the lead-up to Maastricht. The 
Elysée later termed the notion "un gouvernement économique". Indeed, 
President Mitterrand equated economic governance with a strengthening of 
the European Council in a speech in October 1990. The idea became the 
most distinctive and overriding theme of the French negotiating position pri-
or to Maastricht. It reflected the intellectual influence of Social Catholic and 
Social Radical traditions of economic policy. "Economic governance" was a 
key part of Bérégovoy s paper to the IGC of 5 December 1990. Its rationale 
was based on the need for a democratic legitimation of EMU, but also of the 
risks of a divergence between monetary and budgetary policy. There would be 
the need to prevent excessive deficits and to apply sanctions: a matter on 
which France took the lead in the IGC. It figured in the French Draft Treaty 
on EMU of 5 January 1991. 
Be that as it may, references to "economic governance" shocked the 
German Finance Ministry and the Bundesbank. Instead, its own dominant 
8. This section draws on K. Dyson - K. Featherstone, The Road to Maastricht: Negotiating 
Economic and Monetary Union, op.cit. The research for this book involved some 175 person-
al interviews and extensive archival searches. 
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paradigm was of "sound money" and the precepts of Ordo-liberalism. This 
entailed priority to disinflation; budgetary discipline; and currency stability, 
underscored by the vital importance of the credibility of policies within the 
financial markets.9 Indeed, the re-launch of the EMU debate in 1988 had 
owed much to a confluence of support for the "sound money" approach a-
mongst EC central bank governors and the EC Monetary Committee, along-
side Germany. This consensus was a response to what were seen as the policy 
failures of the 1970s and of France, in particular, in 1981-83. In political sci-
ence terms, an epistemic community had emerged of shared normative and 
causal beliefs that would be credible in the financial markets and this helped 
to forge the unanimity of the Delors Committee in its report on EMU in 
1989. A new primacy was given to monetary policy instruments and price 
stability was seen as the priority objective.10 Not only would it not jeopardise 
other objectives, like growth and employment; it was a necessary condition 
for their long-term attainment. Thus, the EMU negotiations gave little atten-
tion to any €-level responsibility for stabilising aggregate demand and the 
avoidance of negative demand shocks. This agenda had been discredited with 
the demise of Keynesianism. There would merely be "soft" law processes ap-
plied to the coordination and monitoring of national fiscal policies and bor-
rowing levels under the "Broad Economic Policy Guidelines" and, after 1997, 
the "Stability & Growth Pact". 
Structural changes also served to advance the new policy consensus. The 
success of the European Monetary System (EMS) in the late 1980s reinforced 
such ideas. This, together with the onset of the single European market, was 
seen as essential preconditions that had not existed at the time of the Werner 
Report and they proved influential in Bundesbank thinking. The growth and 
impact of capital mobility (under the single market) had itself shifted the de-
bate. The free movement of capital facilitated the disciplinary effects of the fi-
nancial markets on national budgets and was seen as efficient in the allocation 
of resources. The financial services sector gained in political influence and fa-
cilitated the ascendancy of the "sound money" paradigm. Alongside these 
shifts was some optimism with respect to the general macro-economic cli-
9. Ibid., p. 2 
10. K. McNamara, The Currency of Ideas: Monetary Politics in the European Union, 
Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY 2008; M. Marcussen, "Ideas and Elites: Danish Macro-
Economic Policy Discourse in the EMU Process", PhD Thesis, University of Aalborg, September 
1998. 
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mate -growth across the EMS had been relatively high for the previous four 
years- and the "feel-good" factor promoted a sense of inclusiveness. 
There were also institutional sensitivities at play. The failure to address fis-
cal policy issues prior to Maastricht was, in part, the result of an unwillingness 
to cede political autonomy over such matters to the EU level. The risks inher-
ent in an heterogeneous monetary union were to be left for adjustment at the 
national level. Ordo-liberalism advocated that a stability culture -matching 
sound money with sound finances- could only be developed "bottom-up" 
-that is, from the domestic level- and it could not be imported from outside 
or "faked". It might also be added that the convergence criteria for entry into 
the "euro" could serve as a means of importing discipline from outside for re-
form advocates at the domestic level.11 Thus, there were philosophical reasons 
to deny competence for fiscal management at the EU level. 
In the years after Maastricht, conditions changed but the policy regime, with 
very minor exceptions, did not. The Italian economic performance looked 
promising and the government of Constantine Mitsotakis in Greece was em-
barked on a dash for qualification, based on an over-confidence in the speed 
of domestic adjustment. The Maastricht negotiators had -in the main- not 
expected all member states to join the convoy of euro-entrants at the outset, but 
the political imperative ebbed. When it came to judging whether the entry 
conditions had been met, there was a shared interest in fudging or massaging the 
tests. In particular, debt levels above the required 60% of GDP were set aside. 
Thus, the Maastricht Treaty had bequeathed: 
• A rejection of EU institutional competence not only to coordinate and set 
economic policy for the euro-area, but also to delve, police and adequately 
punish national governments deviating from the convergence rules. The 
"moral hazard" of governments manipulating the data and of sustaining un-
competitive paths was not addressed properly. 
• An expectation that the Eurozone would not be fully inclusive at the out-
set, but a shift of political interest that made it difficult to block all but Greece 
-and her only temporarily. 
• An assumption that heterogeneity and asymmetric shocks could be han-
dled by the disciplinary power of the financial markets, strengthened by the 
rules on no bailouts (Art. 125) and the "excessive deficit procedure" (Art. 104) 
for lax national governments. 
11. G. Carli, Cinquant' anni di vita Italiana, Editori Laterza, Rome 1993. 
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• A belief that matters of demand management did not belong to the EU 
level and, given the failures of Keynesianism, national governments were best 
served by priority to monetary stability (sound money) as the necessary policy 
regime for growth in the long-term. 
The Maastricht provisions comprised contradictions and gaps. On the one 
hand, the strictures were of no bail-outs, the importance of abiding by the 
rules, and sanctions for those that do not. Solidarity was to be created by the 
imposition of penalties, though the democratic underpinnings of EMU gover­
nance were minimal. There would be no facility to expel errant member s-
tates nor would the latter have a specified legal right of exit. When faced with 
a deep economic crisis -inevitably eliciting strong political and social reac­
tions- what would happen with states unable to deliver compliance? 
Immediately after Maastricht the disciplinary rules were already appearing un­
enforceable.12 
In Dyson and Featherstone, we charted the ideational, institutional, and s-
trategic underpinnings of the "road" to Maastricht. Inevitably, in trying to ex­
am ine the negotiations from the "inside", there was a risk of absorbing the in­
stinctive assumptions of the key actors involved. Thus, in the light of the re­
cent debt crisis, we were not explicit enough in accounting for the progress of 
the "no bail out" rule. We considered it in the context of preference-forma­
tion in different national contexts -especially Germany- but it seemed so in­
evitable and essentially uncontested that we chose not to highlight it as a 
theme in the index. Perhaps more acutely, we gave insufficient attention in 
our conclusions -as, indeed, had the negotiators themselves- to the implica­
tions of the heterogeneity of national politics and administrative systems with 
respect to the ability to abide by the rules set. The issue was one of a different 
kind of asymmetric "shock": the incapacity to implement reforms and accept 
fiscal rules consistent with the Treaty. In a sense, the neglect was strange: how 
could negotiators not be sensitive to the risks of striking deals with politicians 
like Guilo Andreotti, Prime Minister of Italy, for example -an embodiment 
of a "partitocrazia" known for its fiscal laxity? Other member states had sus­
tained high debt to GDP ratios for a long period: Greece and Belgium, being 
two such instances. How could they be expected to deliver "sound finances"? 
The answer we gave was that these limitations accrued from the Maastricht 
12. W. Buiter - G. Corsetti - Ν. Roubini - R. Repullo - J. Frankel, "Excessive Deficits: 
Sense and Nonsense in the Treaty of Maastricht", Economic Policy, Vol. 8, No. 16, Apr., 
1993, pp. 57-100. 
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negotiations being set as a politically-isolated, narrow "core executive" activity.13 
A "technically rational outcome on EMU" had been negotiated "free from the 
complexities of political-union negotiations" leaving "some critical gaps".14 
We did not specify the problem of divergent system capabilities, norms or 
logics as one such gap. Instead, we highlighted the political exposure of the 
ECB -without a location within a political union framework- and a "poten-
tially highly problematic relationship between rulers and ruled".15 Both were 
relevant to the subsequent history of EMU, but were incomplete as an account 
of the political risks. 
More generally, the Maastricht set of rules, the philosophy and its assump-
tions would be very severely tested by the unprecedented growth of capital 
mobility over the euro's first decade. In fairness, the international economy 
had changed since the Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1992: "credit default 
swaps" had then been unknown, the credit rating agencies had barely entered 
the European market,16 and sub-prime mortgages were not on the radar screen. 
No-one foresaw the collapse of major Wall Street institutions like Lehman 
Brothers in September 2008 or the ferocity of the gathering credit crunch. 
Thus, the euro's own failing regime and the wider structural changes in the in-
ternational capital markets served to create a combustible set of conditions. 
3. THE LIMITS OF POLITICAL INTEGRATION 
The Maastricht agreement on EMU was left vulnerable by the absence of eco-
nomic governance, but also by the risks with respect to cross-national solidar-
ity. It was clear that, "The fundamental point remained that the German 
model failed to offer an adequate basis for a sustainable EMU", a "new sense 
of solidarity that would support "burden-sharing" within EMU" was likely to 
prove elusive, as "EMU's Achilles' heel was the prospect of people being asked 
to make sacrifices for others with whom there was a weak sense of identity".17 
13. K. Dyson - K. Featherstone, The Road to Maastricht: Negotiating Economic and 
Monetary Union, op.cit, pp. 746-7. 
14. Ibid., p. 747. 
15. Ibid. 
16. Before the 1990s, the three main credit rating agencies -Standard and Poors, Fitch, 
and Moody's- had few, if any, analysts outside US. 
17. K. Dyson - K. Featherstone, The Road to Maastricht: Negotiating Economic and 
Monetary Union, op.cit., p. 796. 
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Even in the EMU negotiations, German representatives had displayed, "a 
deep-seated mistrust that began with the Greeks and ranged through Italy, 
Spain, and Belgium to include France".18 
Moreover, well before the credit crunch and the debt crisis, the surveys of 
"Eurobarometer" published on behalf of the EU Commission showed a set of 
distinctly un-"communautaire" dispositions. Amongst the EU27 member s-
tates, only 16% of voters' equated Europe with "tolerance" and an alarmingly 
low level of 13% thought it synonymous with "solidarity".19 More generally, 
in 1999 at the birth of the euro currency, "trust" in the EU averaged 40% 
marginally ahead of the 39% who had no trust in the EU. After six decades of 
the European integration process, such results suggested a surprising shallow-
ness of its impact on contemporary attitudes. While some 60% equated 
Europe with "peace" -something of an historical reference point- the absence 
of solidaristic attitudes of relevance to current issues was not a strong base on 
which to face asymmetric economic shocks as Europe was soon to face. 
The survey results were consistent with a number of academic studies ex-
ploring the roots and contours of European identity. In his study of public at-
titudes, Fligstein saw Europe as a transnational society, but one that was shal-
low.20 The extent and depth of cross-national interaction was limited to a mi-
nority. He identified a variation across three social groups. The most pro-
European were the young, the educated, the professional, and the business 
sections of the electorate. The most fearful of Europe tended to be the older, 
poorer, and less-educated voters. In-between was a middle class "swing" con-
stituency, which sometimes saw itself as being "European". Unlike national i-
dentity, Europe lacked a cross-class attachment or appeal.21 Again, the picture 
painted suggests vulnerability for the European project at a time of economic 
crisis. 
The debt crisis when it arose could not easily be equated with a traditional 
left-right political cleavage across Europe. It was more a post-modern disaster 
for the EU. The crisis elicited responses that reinforced national stereotypes 
18. Ibid., p. 372. 
19. European Commission, Eurobarometer 69, Brussels, November 2008. 
20. N. Fligstein, Euro-Clash: The EU, European Identity, and the Future of Europe, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2008. 
21. M. Bruter, "Winning Hearts and Minds for Europe: The Impact of News and Symbols 
on Civic and Cultural European Identity", Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 36, No. 10, 
December 2003, pp. 1148-1179. 
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and antagonisms. Societies turned insular when faced with economic de­
mands. The popular media in Germany was critical of lazy, protected and 
overpaid Greeks. In 2010, the Bild newspaper suggested that the government 
in Athens should sell-off a few Aegean islands to raise funds or to turn the 
Acropolis into a theme-park, for example. In response, the Greek media 
rekindled attacks on Germany for not having paid sufficient war reparations 
and for being hypocritical given that in 1953 it had benefitted from (in real 
terms) a much bigger debt write-off. The British media found in the euro-cri­
sis confirmation of its deeply-rooted euro-scepticism. The EU was being di­
vided almost along a north-south divide; in any event, there was little popular 
base for a common solidarity in response to the crisis. 
4. THE FAILURE TO ESCAPE FROM MAASTRICHT 
The financial crisis that spread across the international system in late 2008 
was exceptional in both its form and its environment. The sub-prime mort­
gage crisis in the US quickly had contagious effects. The latter were gauged by 
the three dominant credit rating agencies -Fitch, Moody's and Standard and 
Poor's- based in the US that constituted "governance without government".22 
Their power over sovereign states would be displayed in Europe where they 
downgraded the sovereign bonds of Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Italy and 
Spain. Fitch's downgrading of Greek bonds on 8 December 2009 and 
Standard and Poor's determination of them being of "junk status" on 27 April 
2010 were particularly consequential for the financing position of Athens. As 
earlier with their reaction to the Far East crisis and US mortgages, the agen­
cies were attacked for their poor forecasting and the pro-cyclical impacts of 
their announcements. A new debate was prompted in Europe as to their oli­
gopolistic power leading to the question of whether Europe should foster its 
own agency. 
In the changed international environment, the EU response showed uncer­
tainty, but also much division and delay. The collapse of Lehman Brothers 
saw national governments hang loose and the EU Commission struggled to 
22. T.J. Sinclair, "Passing judgement: Credit rating processes as regulatory mechanisms of 
governance in the emerging world order", Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 1, 
No.l, 1994. 
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establish a leadership role for itself.23 A body of commentary soon identified 
this pattern of diverse responses as being prompted by structural deficiencies 
in the governance of the Eurozone. The institutional arrangements lacked the 
capacity for a speedy reaction to events, policy discretion was constrained, 
and the ability to act centrally was limited.24 
Faced with the emerging sovereign debt crisis in Greece in the last months 
of 2009, the EU hesitated. The first reaction was to do nothing and to shift 
the responsibility -consistent with the German Ordo-liberal view- back to 
the domestic level. The following February, the Council [under Art. 126(9) 
TFEU] required Greece to cut its deficit and to correct its divergences thereby 
"removing the risk of jeopardising the proper functioning of EMU" 
(16.02.10). Soon afterwards there were press reports of EU governments 
pressing Greece to double the cuts it had announced thus far. The next stage 
saw the Commission monitoring the Greek situation. Its stance was more 
supportive: it confirmed that Greece was abiding by the Council's instructions 
[COM(2010)91] and that its budget measures were on course (09.03.10). But 
the bond spreads Greece faced in the markets were signalling that Athens 
would need a financial rescue. A third chapter saw EU leaders in the European 
Council at the end of March finally agreeing that there could be a rescue deal 
-with funding shared one third from the IMF, two thirds from EU govern-
ments- but it would only come about if all member states agreed and if all 
other options had been exhausted (26.03.10). If a bailout did happen, Greek 
finances and progress would be monitored on a quarterly basis to check that a 
set of conditions -highlighting targets and reform objectives- were being 
met. The Papandreou Government had attempted to protect its position by 
denying it would need a rescue, but one month after the European Council a-
greed the principle the PM announced that Greece did need to activate the 
loan that had been envisaged (23.04.10). Tensions rose both in the markets 
and on the streets of Athens, as protesters feared the austerity conditions to be 
imposed. George Papakonstantinou, as Finance Minister, told the Greek 
23. The Commission did promote its European Economic Recovery Plan in 2008 in 
response to Lehman. See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM: 
2008:0800:FIN:EN:HTML and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008_European_Union_stimulus_ 
plan. 
24. J. Pisani-Ferry - A. Sapir, "Weathering the Storm: Fair-weather versus stormy-weather 
governance in the euro area", Bruegel Policy Contribution, No.3, 2009; P. De Grauwe, "Crisis 
in the Eurozone and how to Deal with It", CEPS Policy Brief No. 204, 15 February 2010. 
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Parliament in a debate to back a bail-out that: "In less than two weeks, a 9 bil-
lion-euro bond comes due and the state coffers don't have this money... As 
we speak today the country can't borrow it from foreign markets and the only 
way to avoid bankruptcy and a halt on payments is to get this money from 
our European partners and the IMF". [05.05.10] 
A game of brinkmanship was evident: the Greek government needed to 
give signals to both its domestic audience, but also to its Eurozone partners. 
Even then, the final chapter in the first rescue had not been closed: it took a 
further nine days before EU finance ministers sanctioned the loan. The pack-
age was set at €1 lObn with strict conditions. The uncertainty and delay in the 
EU acting undoubtedly had driven up the "ante" needed to have credibility to 
convince the international financial markets that the Eurozone would stand 
by one of its members. 
Chancellor Merkel in Germany had felt under much domestic pressure to 
be tough on Greece. In the first months of 2010 she had waited for difficult 
state elections in North-Rhine Westphalia to be completed. She also had to 
take account of the German Constitutional Court's previous decisions on the 
legal conditions under which the Deutschemark had been abandoned for the 
euro which stressed the need for the new currency to be based on stable, dis-
ciplined monetary policies. German public opinion reacted badly to the idea 
of bailing-out Greece, given domestic news reports of Greeks being paid pen-
sions too early and not working long enough. An ordo-liberal instinct es-
chewed rescuing a state and a society living beyond its means. Yet, ultimately, 
the governments of Germany and France, in particular, had been faced with 
the stark choice: bailout Greece or bailout your own banks. A default in 
Athens at that time would have had a devastating financial effect on the do-
mestic banking systems elsewhere in Europe. 
But with the loan, the Eurozone had entered new territory: for the first 
time, the EU and the IMF would engage in extensive monitoring and tough 
conditionality vis-à-vis the fiscal management and economic policy of one of 
its member states. A semi-permanent "Troika" Office was set-up in Athens to 
police the actions of the state administration. Regular meetings with ministers 
and officials were established, with teams sent into ministries to investigate 
procedures and examine "the books". Later, in September 2011, the Troika 
was flanked by a "Task Force" of the EU Commission, created to help the ad-
ministration in Athens to identify and absorb more of the structural funds of 
the EU. Never before had a member state's administration been so penetrated 
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by the EU. The combined monitoring was a major challenge for the EU's 
reach and capability, as well as for the recipient bureaucracy floundering in its 
own weaknesses and lethargy. It involved a difficult clash of attitudes and cul-
tures between the two "sides": young, assertive middle-ranking officials from 
Brussels grilled senior (elected) politicians used to some deference. It was an 
unknown process that both parties had to work out. 
The problems of the Greek state adjusting speedily enough and meeting 
the tough conditions became evident in spring 2011 as Athens missed the a-
greed targets. Crucially, it experienced a shortfall in the tax revenue it was 
raising and the Troika warned it might not be able to sanction the next loan 
instalment. The tensions in the Eurozone were spreading to other states: the 
fear of contagion was prominent. By July 2011, EU leaders had faced the in-
evitable and had agreed that a second Greek bailout would be needed. The 
new loan was set at € 109 billion, it would come with a lower interest repay-
ment rate and a longer period in which to pay it back (fifteen years). Merkel 
insisted that there should be a new element in this loan: the banks that had 
lent recklessly to Greece should suffer a hit. "Private sector involvement" (PSI) 
would mean they took a "haircut", forced to accept they would get less of 
their money back. At the same time, EU leaders agreed that the "European 
Financial Stability Fund" (EFSF) they had sanctioned the year before with 
some €780 billion of funding would be superseded by a larger "European 
Stability Mechanism" (ESM), with a greater leeway in how it could be utilised. 
The funds -and their increase- were a recognition that the problems of the 
Eurozone were no longer confined to Greece and that a bigger war chest was 
needed to assure the survival of the euro in the face of the market onslaught. 
Bailouts had earlier been agreed for Ireland (November 2010) and Portugal 
(May 2011). 
But the July agreement began to unravel over the summer. Finland led an 
initiative to insist that the Greek government should provide collateral for the 
new loans, the Slovakian Parliament seemed that it might not agree the sec-
ond bailout, and the political climate in Austria was also very antagonistic. 
The political clashes and uncertainty increased the speculation on a Greek de-
fault. The Commission denied it was preparing for such an eventuality, 
though German ministers said it could not be ruled out. By October 2011, 
the EU had edged further towards a second rescue deal but it awaited further 
assurances from Greece. A European Council meeting scheduled for mid-
October was put back by a week. When it met on 23 October, a package for 
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Greece involving a €l00bn-euro loan, a 50% (PSI) debt write-off, and more 
austerity measures in Greece was negotiated. New uncertainty was immedi-
ately introduced, however, by the surprise announcement a week later by 
Premier George Papandreou that he would ask for a referendum to be called 
in order to win public backing for the package. His announcement shocked 
and angered President Sarkozy and Chancellor Merkel, as it introduced a new 
conditionality into the protracted deal, and they invited him to emergency 
talks in Cannes just ahead of the G20 summit. Diplomatically, Papandreou 
was seen as having been humiliated at those talks. The reaction to the referen-
dum idea within Greece was, if anything, even more hostile. The leader of the 
main opposition party, Antonis Samaras of New Democracy, had refused to 
say that he would support the deal that had been so long in coming. 
Parliamentarians within Papandreous PASOK (the socialist party) and across 
the parties saw it as a gun to their heads -forced to accept the severe econom-
ic measures- and as too risky: the voters might put in jeopardy not only 
Greece's membership of the Eurozone, but also of the EU. Five days after 
Papandreou had made his surprise announcement, he told Parliament that he 
had agreed to step-down and a new coalition government would be formed. 
At least, he could claim that the referendum initiative had forced Samaras to 
declare that he would support the second bail-out. Lucas Papademos, a for-
mer Vice President of the ECB, became PM of a caretaker government estab-
lished to implement the immediate measures required before the bailout 
would be sanctioned. Significantly, the leaders of Greece's two main parties 
were required to sign written undertakings to the EU Commission that if 
their parties were in government after the upcoming elections they would 
abide by the terms of the planned deal. 
Greece's financial position had worsened during the long delay in securing 
the second bailout. Eventually, Eurozone finance ministers agreed (21.02.12) 
a €130 billion package (co-funded by the IMF and EU governments), which 
involved further unpopular budget cuts and a bigger PSI "haircut". Holders of 
Greek government bonds were pushed to accept losses of around 74% on the 
value of their investments. The arrangement was intended to reduce Greece's 
public debt by more than €100 billion. The pressure remained on Greece. 
Commission President, José Manuel Barroso, told the European Parliament 
in April 2012 that further measures would be needed in Greece after the 
looming national elections on 6 May. Fiscal retrenchment should prioritise 
expenditure cuts, rather than further tax rises. A quick recapitalisation of 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/03/2020 08:12:00 |
LE CHOC DE LA NOUVELLE? 35 
Greek banks should be concluded by September 2012, in order to facilitate 
banks' loans to small and medium enterprises. In order to restore cost-com-
petitiveness, nominal unit labour costs in the private sector should be lowered 
by 15% in the 2012-2014 period. A set of liberalisation measures to improve 
competitiveness in the Greek economy was listed. Military expenditures -and 
the potential to buy hardware from France and Germany- was, by contrast, 
not to be cut. This aside, it was clear that the second bailout was to be under-
scored by stronger pressure on, and monitoring of, Greece. There was rescue-
fatigue on the part of Greece's partners. 
Altogether, the 2012 package constituted the biggest sovereign debt re-
structuring in history. The Commission's own estimates of the support given 
to Greece put it at some €380 billion, equal to 177% of the Greek GDP, or 
€33.600 for each Greek inhabitant.25 The sum included loans, write-downs 
on loans and EU funds delivered to Greece since the beginning of the debt crisis. 
The Commission compared this to the Marshall Plan after 1947 which had in-
volved transfers equal to around 2.1% of the GDP of recipient countries. This 
was somewhat disingenuous as the economic conditions between the two pe-
riods were very different, as were the impacts of the Greek austerity measures. 
The two bailouts resolved Greece's immediate financing needs, but the first 
and even the second were very unlikely in themselves to revive the domestic 
economy, which had already been in recession for five consecutive years. 
The sovereign debt crises in Greece, Ireland and Portugal -and fears of 
them spreading to Italy and Spain, which soon proved valid- provoked a new 
debate on Eurozone governance. Not only had the EMU set-up been found 
wanting, its institutions had also been obliged to act in ways other than the 
expected manner. The bailouts themselves had been crafted in a way so as to 
circumvent the Treaty commitments: it was Eurozone governments, not the 
EU or the ECB that contributed the two-thirds funding alongside the IMF. At 
the same time, the European Central Bank had been forced to innovate in its 
support for governments and the banking systems. The ECB had been estab-
lished to be even more independent than the Bundesbank, but now its actions 
seemed to some to be more comprising politically and to be leaning towards 
the monétisation of deficits. 
A patchwork quilt of measures was initiated. The ESM was close to Sarkozy's 
25. Euractiv, "Brussels to ask Greece for New Budget Cuts", 18 April 2012, http:// 
www.euractiv.com/euro-finance/barroso-ask-greece-new-budget-cu-news-512227. 
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preference for a European Monetary Fund. The ESM would be able to help 
Eurozone states before they needed long-term aid and would be able to recap-
italise banks through loans to governments. But the ESM could only act after EU 
unanimity. In late 2010, the EU Commission proposed six legislative acts to re-
form EMU governance. What was soon dubbed its "Six Pack" involved strength-
ening the automaticity of sanctions on errant governments; the possibility of the 
EU imposing non-interest bearing deposits leading to a fine on member gov-
ernments; stronger Commission monitoring of debts and deficits; a Com-
mission scorecard of macro-economic imbalances; and the establishment of 
consistent, clear reporting rules for national governments. In parallel, the EU 
Council President, Herman van Rompuy, delivered a report on further re-
forms in October 2010. Each was seen as correcting the gaps left by Maastricht. 
Even Chancellor Merkel now used the term "economic governance", a-
longside President Sarkozy at press conferences. But, in reality, they were 
largely re-defining the term. An economic "pole" may be being established, 
but its character was of the stronger imposition of rules and the easier sanc-
tioning of penalties to enforce compliance to "sound money, sound finances" 
across national governments -pressing them to live up to the obligations fore-
seen at Maastricht. In other words, it was more of the same, but with a new 
title: it was not a paradigmatic shift. Indeed, the frame lacked the institutional 
underpinning of economic governance. It was not clear whether the new fines 
would be viable in practice, given likely domestic challenges to their legitima-
cy. Nor was it clear how the ex ante validation of national budgets, during 
what the Commission saw as a budget "semester", would work -especially in 
the face of a strong domestic political challenge behind a deviant package. 
A new "Fiscal Pact" was agreed at a European Council meeting on 2 
March 2012 and signed by 25 of the 27 member governments.26 David 
Cameron replicated John Major's stance at Maastricht by refusing to sign it 
-indeed, he had blocked the initiative to have it as a new EU Treaty at a simi-
lar summit on 8-9 December 2011- and he was joined by the Czech Go-
vernment. The new intergovernmental Pact, formally entitled the "Treaty on 
Stability, Coordination and Governance", faced a ratification process within 
each signatory state. In Ireland a referendum was called, a vote that was won 
with some 60% supporting ratification. The intention was for the new Pact to 
take effect at the start of 2013 if at least 12 states had ratified it. 
26. It had been agreed in principle at a European Council meeting on 31 January 2012. 
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The Pact sought to sanctify the debt and deficit rules. The relevant extracts 
are given in Fig. 1. Art. 3(ii) committed member states to put into their na-
tional laws or constitutions that such provisions be an obligation and that a 
"correction mechanism" for deviations be established. Art. 4 made it a re-
FIGURE 1 
Key Fiscal Pact Provisions: extracts 
Article 3 (i) [on debt and deficit rules] : 
(a) the budgetary position of the general government of a Contracting Party shall 
be balanced or in surplus; 
(b) the rule under point (a) shall be deemed to be respected if the annual structural 
balance of the general government is at its country-specific medium-term objec-
tive, as defined in the revised Stability and Growth Pact, with a lower limit of a 
structural deficit of 0,5 % of the gross domestic product at market prices. The 
Contracting Parties shall ensure rapid convergence towards their respective medi-
um-term objective. The time-frame for such convergence will be proposed by the 
European Commission taking into consideration country-specific sustainability 
risks. Progress towards, and respect of, the medium-term objective shall be evalu-
ated on the basis of an overall assessment with the structural balance as a reference, 
including an analysis of expenditure net of discretionary revenue measures, in line 
with the revised Stability and Growth Pact. 
Art. 8(ii) provided for penalties and fines: 
Where, on the basis of its own assessment or that of the European Commission, a 
Contracting Party considers that another Contracting Party has not taken the nec-
essary measures to comply with the judgment of the Court of Justice referred to in 
paragraph 1, it may bring the case before the Court of Justice and request the im-
position of financial sanctions following criteria established by the European 
Commission in the framework of Article 260 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union. If the Court of Justice finds that the Contracting Party con-
cerned has not complied with its judgment, it may impose on it a lump sum or a 
penalty payment appropriate in the circumstances and that shall not exceed 0,1 % 
of its gross domestic product. The amounts imposed on a Contracting Party 
whose currency is the euro shall be payable to the European Stability Mechanism. 
Art. 11 provided for closer economic policy coordination: 
the Contracting Parties ensure that all major economic policy reforms that they 
plan to undertake will be discussed ex-ante and, where appropriate, coordinated a-
mong themselves. Such coordination shall involve the institutions of the European 
Union as required by European Union law. 
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quirement that national debt be kept within 60% of GDP. Art. 8(ii) allowed 
for one government to challenge the fiscal position of another before the 
Court and the latter could impose a lump sum payment or fine. The closer e-
conomic coordination of Art. 11 was designated as a shared learning process, 
but it also posed a common constraint on the options available. 
More radical reform options were off the negotiating table in the on-going 
European debate. A number of economists urged the adoption of standard 
operating procedures for independent national monetary regimes: notably, 
the ability of the ECB to "print money" to help overcome liquidity problems. 
A parallel idea was to create common euro-bonds, to share the debt and bol-
ster its financing with the credibility of the stronger economies. To criticisms 
that this would not help with "moral hazard" problems, the Bruegel think 
tank in Brussels proposed two types of euro-bonds -one for those govern-
ments with debt above 60% of their GDP, the other for those with lower 
debts. Printing money and sharing national debts, however, fundamentally 
clashed with the ordo-liberal tradition and German opposition made such 
options off limits. Bigger EU budget transfers -as proposed in the MacDougall 
Report of 1977 and paralleling the adjustment mechanisms of other federal 
systems- were also not considered. 
Throughout the debt crisis, the EU kept faith with the Maastricht model 
on EMU. Far more than in 1991, the German government was able to set the 
terms and impose its leadership. President Sarkozy ceded more ground than 
had Mitterrand and was less assertive in the cause of economic governance, 
the most distinctive French position in the 1991 negotiations. The Fiscal Pact 
-overwhelmingly Chancellor Merkel's initiative- establishes the debt and d-
eficit rules on the strongest legal basis, recalibrating the values set at 
Maastricht to make the policy constraint tighter. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
It is evident that the model of governance established for EMU in the 
Maastricht Treaty rested on a paradigm of "sound money, sound finances" 
with its origins in German ordo-liberalism. From that base, the model be-
came vulnerable in the face of a crisis: it lacked the instruments and capability 
of economic governance -to police, but also to aid. This risk was exacerbated 
by the shallowness of public legitimation -seen in attitudes towards solidarity, 
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trust, tolerance- that would be needed if re-balancing actions were to be tak-
en. The EU s response to the emergence of the euro-crisis -its uncertainty, di-
vision and delays- showed the extent to which it remained locked-in to the 
Maastricht frame. Even the new Fiscal Pact remains consistent with those 
provisions, recalibrating and toughening-up the rules. There is a new rhetoric 
of "economic governance" -redefined since 1990- and a mechanism by 
which governments should consult their partners, ex ante, on any domestic 
reform initiatives, but this is a provision free of budget transfers and simply 
facilitates mutual surveillance. The Eurozone is not breaking-free of the 
Maastricht legacy. 
A path dependence akin to what Liebowitz and Margolis termed "Third 
Degree"27 is evident: at the initial point of decision: alternatives were rejected 
(due to Germany's lead) that were accepted as more efficient by others 
(France, in particular) and the outcome proved sub-optimal for all, especially 
as the set course was maintained for too long in the light of the new condi-
tions, increasing the adjustment costs. 
The path risks an iteration of financial crises -in debt exposure and bank-
ing system viability- as "rescued" states are left on a path of austerity and a s-
low return to growth. Few expect the second Greek bailout to prevent a fur-
ther re-structuring crisis. 
The issues of governance and of solidarity remain to be addressed. The 
Eurozone has to deal with the risks of heterogeneity, not only of economic 
performance but of political system: of the weaknesses of domestic state ad-
ministrations to oversee reform, of social dissensus blocking reform agendas. 
The Eurozone is now committed to a long-term domestic oversight function 
in Athens: its capabilities are being stretched like never before. Economically, 
the calls for a shift of emphasis towards growth, rather than internal devalua-
tion policies, are set to be much stronger. The intellectual debate has shifted, 
along with public attitudes. The survival of the euro may well depend on the 
EU adopting a more fulsome economic governance, drawing on neo-
Keynesian demand management and mutual support. If not, the euro may 
face retreat: a split in the Eurozone or a smaller bloc. The flagship policy of 
the EU -the euro- carries with it much baggage. If the fate of the European 
project is left exposed to the narrow paradigm of Maastricht, supported by 
IMF orthodoxy, it may be seriously undermined. 
27. S.J. Liebowitz - S.E Margolis, "Path Dependence, Lock in and History", op.cit. 
Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/03/2020 08:12:00 |
